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Abstract  
This study highlights both the significance and impact of the developing changes in 
the last decades around Europe, the notion-related adjustments that remain to be 
carried and in parallel to provide a more general explanation concerning the 
institution of sovereignty in relation to the process of European integration. The main 
questions that this article seeks to answer are the following: Who governs who within 
the EU? How does the European nexus of institutions and governance affect 
sovereignty? Which are the main consequences of the Maastricht’s framework in 
relation to sovereignty? In order to provide an answer to the above questions, we 
intend to analyze the relationship of the institution of sovereignty and the ability of 
exercising independent economic policy within the EMU as well as reexamine the 
development of this relationship in close regard to the process of European 
integration. The major contribution of this research is that offers a complementary 
study in order to understand better the relationship between European integration and 
state sovereignty. This research integrates sovereignty in the current debates, and 
provides an exegesis not only for the main factors that affect the transformation of the 
EMU but also for the limits of the European integration. 
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Asymmetrical Sovereignty, European Integration, and the Grey Zone of 
European Union Politics  
Introduction 
In the aftermath of World War II, intense voices were raised against the sovereign 
role of the nation state.  The main cause for this uproar was the phenomenon of 
globalization and its impact on national economies1. On a European level, during the 
last decades, the process of European integration created a new framework within 
which the nation state became the member state2 and consequently the notion of 
national sovereignty adopted both a new meaning and a new context.  Hence, the 
issues of national sovereignty carried a significant amount of importance for the 
process of European integration. This fact raised long term questions concerning the 
democratic legitimization of the European project as its economic efficiency 
decreased. But, in spite of its tremendous importance, the relationship between the 
institution of sovereignty and European integration as well as what this suggests for 
the European Union (EU) member states, especially on the level of Economic and 
Monetary Union (EMU), has not yet been adequately studied. In fact, most integration 
theories do not provide a clear answer whether sovereignty is a national or a European 
issue3. 
Both the institution of sovereignty and the process of European integration comprise 
two major study topics in the field of Political Science which they not only maintain a 
dynamic nature through time but they also follow opposite routes. In the European 
context, the more the process of European integration advances, the more sovereignty 
competences are transferred from the national to the supranational level and the 
sovereignty of the member states is questioned. This evolving competitive 
relationship becomes more draconian, demanding and colliding in the framework of 
the EMU, since it poses unequivocal limits to the exercise of sovereign rights 
concerning the independent exercise of economic policy by the member states.  
Besides, the determination of the optimal level of delegation of sovereignty in 
economic policy is one of the most fundamental questions we are obliged to answer4. 
Under these circumstances, the beginning of the process of integration echoes the 
beginning of the end for the exercise of sovereignty by national states as the latter are 
undermined by the EMU institution. Apparently, EMU seems to be the institution 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 In this article we will examine the relationship between state sovereignty and the autonomy 
of economic policy within EMU. Therefore, we will omit important aspects of sovereignty 
linked to a series of other issues.  
2 Bickerton, C. 2012. European Integration: From Nation-States to Member States. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press.  
3 Ibid. at 22.  
4 Verdun, A. 2007. “A Historical Institutionalist Analysis of the Road to Economic and 
Monetary Union: A Journey with Many Crossroads.” In Making History: European 
Integration and Institutional Change at Fifty, edited by S. Meunier, and K.R. McNamara, 
195-210. New York: Oxford University Press.  
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which directly questions sovereignty’s central role in economic policy. But, is this 
really the case? Under which conditions and rules has this relationship been formed 
and how does it affect the very process of European integration and the role of the 
nation state?  
The purpose of this study is to highlight both the significance and impact of the 
developing changes in the last decades around Europe, the notion-related adjustments 
that remain to be carried and in parallel to provide a more general explanation 
concerning the institution of sovereignty in relation to the process of European 
integration5. The main questions that this article seeks to answer are the following: 
Who governs who within the EU? How does the European nexus of institutions and 
governance affect sovereignty? Which are the main consequences of the EMU’s 
framework in relation to sovereignty? In order to provide an answer to the above 
questions, we intend to analyze the relationship of the institution of sovereignty and 
the ability of exercising independent economic policy within the EMU as well as 
reexamine the development of this relationship in close regard to the process of 
European integration. Additionally, we will attempt to examine the interplay among 
the main factors of the process of integration and provide an answer to the question in 
what degree does state sovereignty affect the very process of integration and the 
efficiency of governmental economic policies. As we will argue, within EMU the 
notion and context of sovereignty are evolving. While, in its outer dimension the 
creation of EMU has imposed sheer limits to national sovereignty, internally member 
states seek to redefine their role by using the exercise of national sovereign rights via 
what appears to be an independent economic policy. Within this context, EMU has 
imposed a kind of asymmetrical exercise of national sovereignty by member states 
and this phenomenon becomes even more apparent during the years of economic 
crisis. Both on monetary policy and on a fiscal policy we observe the exercise of an 
asymmetrical type of sovereignty since the most powerful member states impose on 
the less dominant not only because of their power but mainly, because of the 
existence of institutional architecture in which equality is rather impossible. This type 
of unequal exercise of sovereignty on the economic level is achieved mainly via the 
institutional structure created the last years due to the process of European integration.  
This institutional structure, which belongs neither to the supranational nor to the 
national level, creates a grey area in which European politics takes place. Due to this 
institutional structure, certain states rule over others. Yet, this fact is a backward step 
for EU’s historic mission to ensure the equality and power of its member states6. 
Thus, during Eurozone’s transformation, because of the process of European 
integration, the institution of sovereignty was deterritorialized and the exercise of 
sovereignty is now practiced in blurred level among the national and transnational.  In 
this level, sovereignty is exercised even more asymmetrically carrying with it huge 
blows to the democratic legitimization of the plan and to the very essence of European 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Therefore we should look beyond the research focusing on isolated events to the overall 
history. See, Ludlow (2010). 
6 See, Fabbrini (2015, 2016). 
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integration. It is evident that since no nation state could exist without sovereignty in a 
geographical area, no member state can also exist without the deterritorialized kind of 
sovereignty which is exercises asymmetrically due to the existence of institutional 
architecture within this blurred area of European politics. 
In the second chapter, we will delve into the evolving nature of sovereignty. In the 
third one we will examine the theoretical background of the meaning of sovereignty. 
In the fourth chapter we will highlight the changes resulting from the Maastricht 
Treaty7 on the states’ sovereignty. In the fifth chapter we will analyse the impact of 
Maastricht on economic governance. As a final point, in the sixth chapter the 
conclusion of the study will be presented.  
The evolving nature of the notion of sovereignty 
The notion of sovereignty, in spite of the fact that it maintains an important role in the 
theory of international relations, it is constantly shifting depending on the nature of 
political and economic conditions8. Early on, from the sixteenth century, the French 
philosopher Jean Bodin (1530-1596) provided the first definition on the notion of 
sovereignty. According to Bodin, sovereignty is a ‘supreme principle of citizens and 
subjects, unbound by the law’9. As Jean Bodin claims, sovereignty is ‘a perpetual, 
humanly unlimited, and unconditional right to make, interpret and execute law’10. 
Back then, France lay in tatters because of the horrible civil conflicts and the 
restoration of balance required the strengthening of the role of the monarch. But that 
was not all. During that period, capitalism appears as a new form of economic 
organization and production11. The emergence of the capitalist way of production 
created a new context within which the main players had to claim their new role. 
Within this framework, the role of the church had to be gradually downplayed 
whereas the role of the sovereign government, had to be praised. Such were the 
commands of capitalism and national sovereignty had to be transformed in such a way 
so as to meet the demands of the new world. Yet, the notion of sovereignty at that 
time had not received a clear definition12. It was, nonetheless, presented as one of the 
most significant traits of a contemporary nation state and of the spread of capitalism.  
Almost a century later as the great transformation occurred, the British philosopher 
Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) noted the ardent need for transferring this supreme 
authority from the government to the people, hence the French Revolution (1789) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 This study is part of a larger research concerning sovereignty as filtered by the lenses of the 
crisis.  
8 Keohane, R. 2002. “Ironies of Sovereignty: The European Union and the United States.” 
Journal of Common Market Studies 40 (4): 743-765.  
9 Sabine, G. 1961. A History of Political Theory. New York: Rinehart and Winston, at 405.  
10 Sabine, G. 1961. A History of Political Theory. New York: Rinehart and Winston, at 407.  
11 Frieden, J. 2012. “The Modern Capitalist World Economy: A Historical Overview.” In The 
Oxford Handbook of Capitalism, edited by D. Mueller. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
12 Biersteker, T. and C. Weber. 1996. State Sovereignty as Social Construct. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
5	  
	  
symbolized that exact transition13. In reality though, the people could only exercise 
this supreme authority via a government they would elect and legitimize. In parallel, 
during this early transition, the institution of sovereignty evolved and developed 
simultaneously with the central role of the later contemporary nation state. In other 
words, in order for the end of history to be completed14, many of the features 
accompanying the modern economic world had to meet their role, including the 
dynamic definition of sovereignty. For this reason, the Treaty of Westphalia (1648), 
which is by many considered the starting point for the creation of modern nation 
states, was just a transitional stage to the evolution process. In reality, none of the two 
Treaties, that of Munster and Osnabruck, included an explicit or implicit mention to 
the definition of sovereignty since it became just the consequence of the 
negotiations15. That is, the Treaty of Westphalia was a result of years of fermentation, 
preparation and conflict and there exists an unjustified myth around its impact on the 
creation of a modern transnational system.16 
The modern interstate system and the institution of sovereignty were not only affected 
by the events of that early age with the emergence of the capitalist way of production. 
They were also influenced by the changes introduced in the 20th century and more 
specifically by the appearance of a new postwar international economic system. At 
the wake of the Second World War, it became apparent that the role of the nation state 
and the notion of sovereignty had to change context again, as contemporary nations 
struggled to create a new international monetary and financial system based on 
Keynesian, Monetarist and Neoliberal ideas. Sovereignty had to be adjusted to the 
new status quo. Multiple causes triggered this new change. First, it was the 
decolonization through which the modern world was reshaped into sovereign and 
independent nations. Second, the creation of postwar international organizations and 
especially the United Nations (UN), the World Trade Organization and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), which set explicit limits to the sovereignty of 
nations. Third, there was the end of the Cold War and the dominance of capitalism. 
Fourth, there was the phenomenon of globalization which gained ground in the post 
war era mainly through the process of denationalization. Fifth, the emergence of new 
forms of peripheral economic integration like the EU. Sixth, the new significant 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Κουλουµπής, Θ. 1995. Διεθνείς Σχέσεις. Εξουσία και Δικαιοσύνη. Αθήνα: Παπαζήση, at 76.  
14 Fukuyama, F. 2006. The End of History and the Last Man. New York: The Free Press. 
15 Croxton, D. 1999. “The Peace of Westphalia of 1648 and the Origins of Sovereignty.” The 
International History Review 21 (3): 569-591.  
16 Caporaso, J. 2000. “Changes in the Westphalian Order. Territory, Public Authority and 
Sovereignty.” International Studies Review 2 (2): 1-28; Krasner, S. 1995. “Compromising 
Westphalia.” International Security 20 (3): 115-151; Krasner, S. 1999. Organized Hypocrisy. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press; Osiander, A. 2001. “Sovereignty, International 
Relations, and the Westphalian Myth.” International Organization 55 (2): 251-287. 
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challenges which rose against states through the creation of new institutions and 
global governance. Seventh, there was the technological revolution which occurred 
during the last decades with the invention of internet and computers. Eighth, the 
increasing importance concentrated on non-governmental players in the international 
and national level. 
While the notion and context of sovereignty changed, two opposite forces dominated 
in it. The first enhanced the nation state and the sovereignty via the process of 
decolonization and the triumph of liberal democracy over communism. The second 
one corroded the foundation of the nation state and sovereignty via the demands 
presented by the new globalized monetary and financial system. Under such 
circumstances, while the Declaration of Principles of International Law of 1970 
stressed the fact that every state maintains the right to be sovereign over its territorial 
integrity and its political independence, our experience signified that the events of the 
last approximately forty years led to the opposite conclusion. All the above affected 
not only the notion and importance of sovereignty but also the ontological status of 
the state, the modus operandi of the entire international system17. Due to the 
increasing interdependency and complexity of the modern international system, a new 
framework was created within which state power and state sovereignty should be 
studied again because of the influence by international and transnational factors.18   
The Theoretical Background of the Notion 
Various noteworthy contributions have been carried out concerning the issue of 
sovereignty. Yet, even today on a theoretical level the notion, the importance and the 
role of sovereignty remain a huge puzzle19, since the categories listed under this term 
are multiple20. For many scholars, the principles of the notion should be searched 
back in the historical past,21 whereas for others sovereignty is a modern term22 . Some 
argue that the end of sovereignty has arrived23 whereas others support that the notion 
has lost a great part of its importance24. Consequently, this fact cultivates a sequence 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Bartelson, J. 2014. Sovereignty as Symbolic Form. New York: Routledge, at 1.  
18 Kriesi, H., E. Grande., R. Lachat., M. Dolezal., S. Bornshier. and T. Frey. 2008. West 
European Politics in the Age of Globalization. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
19 Lee, S. 1997. “A Puzzle of Sovereignty.” California Western International Law Journal 27 
(2): 241-263.  
20 Krasner, S. 1999. Organized Hypocrisy. Princeton: Princeton University Press; Risse, T. 
2013. “Governance under Limited Sovereignty.” In Back to Basics: State Power in a 
Contemporary World, edited by M. Finnemore, and J. Golsdstein. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press.  
21 Hinsley, F. 1986. Sovereignty. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
22 Croxton, D. 1999. “The Peace of Westphalia of 1648 and the Origins of Sovereignty.” The 
International History Review 21 (3): 569-591.  
23 Camilleri, J. and J. Falk. 1992. End of Sovereignty?. The Politics of a Shrinking and 
Fragmenting World. London: Edward Elgar Publishing. 
24 Bellamy, R., and D. Castiglione. 1997. “Building the Union: The Nature of Sovereignty in 
the Political Architecture of Europe.” Law and Philosophy 16 (4): 421-445.  
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of theoretical anomalies25. Hence, for some scholars sovereignty can be absolute26, 
unlimited, undivided27, exclusive and competitive28, and in contrast for others it is 
deemed relative29, limited30, pooled and shared31, webbed32, imperial33 or even 
divided34. Its meaning carries both negative and positive formats35 and thus we can 
elaborate on both the internal36 and the domestic37 as well as for its external 
dimension.38  
As already highlighted, due to globalization, sovereignty has contributed to the partial 
denationalization of national territory and has ceded parts of its components to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Bartelson, J. 1995. A Genealogy of Sovereignty. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
26 Bodin, J. (1992) On Sovereignty: Four Chapters from Six Books of the Commonwealth. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Hobbes, T. 1651. Leviathan. Harmondsworth: 
Penguin.  
27 James, A. 1999. “The Practice of Sovereign Statehood in Contemporary International 
Society.” Political Studies 47 (3): 457–473. 
28 Spruyt, H. 2005. Ending Empire: Contested Sovereignty and Territorial Partition. Ithaka 
and London: Cornell University Press. 
29 Wildhaber, L. 1986. “Sovereignty and International Law.” In The Structure and Process of 
International Law: Essays in Legal Philosophy, Doctrine and Theory, edited by R. 
Macdonald, and D. M. Johnston. Dordrecht: Nijhoff.  
30 Lapidoth, R. 1992. “Sovereignty in Transition.” Journal of International Affairs 45 (2): 
325-346; Risse, T. 2013. “Governance under Limited Sovereignty.” In Back to Basics: State 
Power in a Contemporary World, edited by M. Finnemore, and J. Golsdstein. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press.  
31 Keohane, R. 2003. “Political Authority after Intervention: Gradations in Sovereignty.” In 
Humanitarian Intervention. Ethical, Legal, and Political Dilemmas, edited by J. L. Holzgrefe. 
and R.O Keohane. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Krasner, S. 2004. “Sharing 
Sovereignty: New Institutions for Collapsed and Failing States.” International Security 29 
(2): 85-120; Peterson, J. 1997. “The European Union: Pooled Sovereignty, Divided 
Accountability.” Political Studies 45 (3): 559-578.  
32 Μανιτάκης, Α. 2001. Συνταγµατική Οργάνωση του Κράτους. Θεσσαλονίκη: Σάκκουλας.  
33 Hardt, M. and A. Negri. 2000. Empire. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.  
34 MacCormick, N. 1993. “Beyond the Sovereign State.” The Modern Law Review 56 (1): 1-
18. 
35 Jackson, R. 1996. Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
36 Habermas, J. 1996. “The European Nation State. Its Achievements and Its Limitations. On 
the Past and Future of Sovereignty and Citizenship.” Ratio Juris 9 (2): 125-137.  
37 Krasner, S. 1999. Organized Hypocrisy. Princeton: Princeton University Press.  
38 Eckes, C. 2015. “The Reflexive Relationship between Internal and External Sovereignty.” 
Irish Journal of European Law 18 (1): 33-47; James, A. 1999. “The Practice of Sovereign 
Statehood in Contemporary International Society.” Political Studies 47 (3): 457–473; 
Keohane, R. 2002. “Ironies of Sovereignty: The European Union and the United States.” 
Journal of Common Market Studies 40 (4): 743-765; Prokhovnik, R. 1996. “Internal/external: 
The state of sovereignty.” Contemporary Politics 2 (3): 7-20; Thompson, H. 2006. “The Case 
for External Sovereignty.” European Journal of International Relations 12 (2): 251-274.  
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organizations beyond the state39. In this way, on a universal level an institutional 
structure has already been established which should be seriously considered in every 
discussion around the term of sovereignty40, while under specific conditions the very 
meaning of the term can be equaled to organized hypocrisy41. In parallel, as Thomas 
Risse claims ‘most states in the contemporary system are “problematic sovereigns”’.42 
Yet, as he stresses, the situation does not entail weakness to the provision of collective 
goods and services or in governance.43 All the above can be provided by several 
combinations among governmental and non-governmental sides which employ mainly 
non-hierarchical ways of guidance44. In any case, we should not forget that 
sovereignty as a notion defines the modern international class45 and lays the 
foundation for the modern legal and political class as it “’stands as a representation of 
the autonomy of the political’.46 
Since sovereignty was affected and therefore evolved in a great degree by the 
establishment of the capitalist way of production and liberal democracy around the 
world, it would definitely be more affected by the new forms of peripheral integration 
developed in the post war era and especially by the creation of the EU. In fact, the 
concept can become the reference point for the development of the European 
integration process47, as European integration set both to member states and 
sovereignty significant challenges.48  The first works on the impact of the European 
integration process to sovereignty published in 1990’s.49 This event coincides with the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 Sassen, S. 1996. Losing Control: Sovereignty in the Age of Globalization. New York: 
Columbia University Press.  
40 Krasner, S. 1988. “Sovereignty. An Institutional Perspective.” Comparative Political 
Studies 21 (1): 66-94.  
41 Krasner, S. 1999. Organized Hypocrisy. Princeton: Princeton University Press.  
42 Risse, T. 2013. “Governance under Limited Sovereignty.” In Back to Basics: State Power 
in a Contemporary World, edited by M. Finnemore, and J. Golsdstein. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, at 78.  
43 Risse, T. 2013. “Governance under Limited Sovereignty.” In Back to Basics: State Power 
in a Contemporary World, edited by M. Finnemore, and J. Golsdstein. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, at 79.  
44 See also, Risse (2011). 
45 Bartelson, J. 1995. A Genealogy of Sovereignty. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
46 This issue for Loughlin (2003, 80) is rather important since we should not forget that every 
regime is legitimated by the interaction between the citizens and the state. Therefore, 
according to Loughlin (2003, 80) the issues of ‘competence and capacity are inextricably 
linked’, Loughlin, M. 2003. “Ten Tenets of Sovereignty.” In Sovereignty in Transition, edited 
by N. Walker. Oxford, Hart Publishing. 
47 Glencross, A. 2009. What Makes the EU Viable? European Integration in the Light of the 
Antebellum US Experience. New York: Palgrave McMillan.  
48 Avbelj, M. 2014. “Theorizing Sovereignty and European Integration.” Ratio Juris 27 (3): 
344-363.  
49 Bellamy, R., and D. Castiglione. 1997. “Building the Union: The Nature of Sovereignty in 
the Political Architecture of Europe.” Law and Philosophy 16 (4): 421-445; Lee, S. 1997. “A 
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discussions on the Maastricht and the repercussions of the EMU. Through this 
evolution, sovereignty has been transformed to many forms50 and delegated on a 
different level beyond the state.51 But, what are the main effect of this transition? Yet, 
how does European integration interact with sovereignty? There is an apparent and a 
less obvious answer to that question. The apparent one supports that European 
integration and sovereignty have a competitive relationship52, as the process of 
integration advances, the sovereignty competences are delegated to the supranational 
level entailing the weakness of national sovereignty. This fact though, presupposes 
the creation of explicit dividing lines between the national and the supranational level. 
Have these lines been drawn within the modern European system? The less obvious 
answer suggests that on long-term basis sovereignty can be transmuted53. This 
signifies that gradually a new form of sovereignty is likely to be created in a post-
national level within which the main traits of the state sovereignty are not erased but 
transformed54. But, as we can assume that sovereignty can be transformed, we cannot 
suggest with certainty that the outcome of this change will lead to a new public 
European political arena free of dominant, despotic and ethnocratic elements. Even 
more, we cannot assume that there will be a center in which sovereignty will be 
exercised collectively and which will legitimate the decisions, acts and deeds 
delivered by it. That is, via the process of European integration a European public 
political sphere can be created, within which the characteristics and the new way of 
exercising sovereignty will be blurred. This signifies that during the transition to a 
supranational state, in any given form, a third level of policy and decision making 
could be established, situated between the national and the supranational. Therefore, 
the national and supranational components are forced to solve issues of governance 
problems within a framework where as we support, an asymmetrical form of 
sovereignty is exercised. In other words, as we argue, within the EU there is already a 
grey area in which a major part of policy and decision making is practiced. In this 
grey area sovereignty is transferred, without being divided or shared, and it is 
asymmetrically exercised causing huge repercussions on the efficiency and 
legitimization of the project. The notion of asymmetry implies that the final result is 
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affected by the unequal negotiating position due to the institutional architecture of the 
EMU in which the power and authority of member states is exercised unequal within 
the grey area of European politics. It is not the power and authority, rather it is the 
institutional grey zone within the member states can exercise power and authority 
unequally. In this area, the less powerful states do not have the ability to materialize 
policy and decision-making while they are overruled by other member states. 
Therefore, the limits of  EMU are defined not only by the sovereignty limits which 
member state governments set free within an intergovernmental game, based on 
particular ideas in the process of European integration, but also from the practices 
exercised within the grey area in which domination takes place. This fact carries 
major consequences on both the theoretical level and the process of European 
integration.  
European Integration and Sovereignty within EMU 
The Maastricht Treaty which was signed on the 7th of February 1992 and was 
validated by all its members on November 1st 1993, was the point of reference in the 
process of European integration and its outcome is still present today.55 The Treaty 
not only incorporated and multiplied a series of competitive rationales56, but it was 
also the final product of a procedure of political and economic transformation in 
Europe which was affected by various other factors57. In Maastricht, a new 
institutional and politico-economic framework of economic governance was launched 
in which the balance among its participants was unpredictable. The same applied for 
the exercise of sovereign rights in the implementation of economic policy. Hence, the 
consequences of the massive changes triggered by the Treaty remain unknown.      
The EMU was a simultaneously economic and political project.58 It maintained its 
economic dimension because it restructured the economic policy and the economic 
efficiency of Europe and as for its political dimension, the establishment of the 
common currency and the ECB were products of political negotiations, validations 
and referendums causing a major impact on both the operation of the nation state and 
the context of sovereignty.59 The main goal of the Treaty centered on the economic 
and political integration of Europe, beyond the European Monetary System and the 
Exchange Rate Mechanism which had endured severe blows at that time. Under the 
given circumstances, in Maastricht European leaders were committed to a unique 
initiative with an unpredictable course and outcome since the design and realization of 
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economic policy and governance were in great degree granted to supranational hands. 
Therefore, this transfer to the supranational institutions confined the freedom of action 
by nation states.60 
Yet, which are the main characteristics of the confinement of an independent 
economic policy in the post-Maastricht era which have been affecting the relationship 
of European integration and sovereignty? First of all, the Treaty brought up serious 
sovereignty issues related to the exercise of independent economic policy on the 
monetary and fiscal level which were immediately expressed by the emerging 
difficulties around the validation process. When the discussion concerning 
sovereignty escapes the conventional context and it is transferred to the level of 
economic policy, then a state is considered sovereign when it has control over policy 
and decision making mechanisms related to monetary and fiscal policy. 
On the level of monetary policy, the context and the role of member states were more 
explicit. After the founding of the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) and the 
ECB, the greatest part of monetary policy and consequently the sovereignty 
competences were transferred to a supranational organization. The ECB would from 
now on be the only responsible for the exercise of monetary and exchange rate policy 
in the Eurozone. On this level, the shift from the national to the supranational level 
was almost instantly achieved without any problems. But, even in this occasion, ECB 
had major challenges to confront. 
First, its primary objective is price stability and not growth. This objective was the 
outcome of two conditions: a. the monetarist revolution of that time and b. Germany’s 
strategic position in the creation of EMU (De Grauwe 2009). Therefore, in order for 
Germany to participate in the European project, it had to impose limits on the price 
level and on inflation. Already, in the early 80s both France and Germany shared 
identical views on the price stability and the ECB independence.61 This fact though, 
did not signify that ECB was not interested in other economic policy-related issues 
but it argued that such issues should be supported without damaging price stability. 
Second, ECB is regularly considered as a not democratically legitimate and 
transparent institution. Willem Buiter seems rather aptly to support that ECB suffers 
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from democratic legitimization deficiency62. Due to the fact that ECB does not 
maintain mechanisms which would represent the preferences of the Eurozone citizens, 
serious speculations are raised concerning the level of democracy a fact which by 
itself attacks the credibility of the institution.63 Under the given circumstances, 
democratic legitimization seems to be ECB’s Achilles’ heel.64 
Third, ECB was not the absolute responsible for the stability of the financial system 
and could not publish bonds or use other tools for efficiently coping with public debts 
or potential financial crises. This inability though was of vital importance to the 
viability of a national economy or a monetary union.65 In ECB, for example, the 
jurisdiction of the lender of last resort was never transferred. While the governments 
of the member states transferred the exclusive jurisdiction of the exercise of monetary 
policy to ECB, making it completely independent, they did not transfer the ability to 
act as a true trustee of the monetary issues of EMU. Therefore, ECB was only 
equipped with the necessary and not the sufficient tools of fiscal discipline.66 Hence, 
we realize that for particular reasons which are related to the preferences and interests 
located on a domestic level, certain basic functions of ECB are absent from its 
jurisdiction since they were never transferred to a supranational level. 
At the level of fiscal policy, the situation is rather different. The sovereignty of fiscal 
and budgetary policy was never allocated to a supranational organization.67 This 
contributed to the creation of an EMU with strong asymmetry features within which 
the economic governance becomes impossible.68 More specifically, while the 
Maastricht Treaty included explicit accession criteria, it did not include clear 
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provisions for ensuring viable levels of fiscal deficits and public debts.69 The 
convergence criteria and the creation of ECB were inadequate to secure a long-term 
economic stability. As for the determination of the later fiscal regime, member states 
had the following three options: a) to become the object of a voluntary agreement 
similar to the accession criteria of EMU b) to create explicit rules in the context of the 
Stability and Growth Pact70 (SGP) c) to create a supranational authority responsible 
for such issues71. What concerned the German side was the potential danger of the 
subversion of its credibility by adding vulnerable states in the EMU. This danger 
could become a real threat either due to non-viable debts and inflation, or due to the 
‘free-riders’.72 In the mid-90s, German Finance Minister Theo Waigel had highlighted 
that European economic integration had to be directed beyond the convergence 
criteria, via the launching of a ‘Stability Council’.73 Already, in September 1995, 
Theo Waigel wished to formalize the fiscal discipline rules in EMU.74 Waigel’s 
proposal is worth-mentioning since it was the first proposal towards a supranational 
integration of economic policies.75 But, as soon as Waigel realized the consequences 
created by his proposal, which is the fact that the French side would consider it as a 
step towards gouverment economique, he withdrew it.76 
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 During the 1996 Dublin Summit Meeting, the finance ministers of the member states 
agreed on the need of a Stability Pact for the empowerment of ECB, which later 
during the Amsterdam European Council, was renamed to Stability and Growth Pact 
(SGP). In the context of later negotiations, France had accepted the fact that in case a 
member state violated the rules of SGP, it should be penalized. In 1997, the newly-
elected French Prime Minister Loinel Jospin supported that the SGP issue had to be 
revisited. But even when SGP became again the object of negotiations, Jospin only 
managed to convince the European Council to adopt a special resolution on growth 
and labor.77 After mutual compromises SGP, which was adopted in June 17th 1997 in 
Amsterdam and was later revised in June 27th 2005, became the EU control 
mechanism through which member states could not excessively increase their deficits 
and debts. 
Which were the main causes for the creation of SGP78? The intergovernmental 
approaches focus on the role developed by member states for the safeguarding of their 
national interests. Based on this context, Germany and France are deemed as the most 
important players who affected the course of negotiations as well as their final 
result.79 While Germany80 is considered to have maintained the dominant role in the 
creation of SGP, France was the most important influential opposition force in the 
entire process81 According to intergovernmental approaches, the creation of SGP was 
based on the converging views of the two dominant states of Germany and France on 
the supreme level of decision-making (European Council and ECOFIN). As Martin 
Heipertz and Amy Verdun mentioned ‘the origins and the creation of the SGP 
underline the importance of relative power of the Member States, showing how their 
preferences shape the outcome’.82 In contrast, the theory of liberal 
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intergovernmentalism stressed that the creation of SGP was the result of the 
converging interests of the most powerful member states during the process of 
decision-making in the ECOFIN meetings. Leila Simona Talani suggests that we 
should analyze the macroeconomic interests of the most powerful member states of 
Eurozone in various socioeconomic areas.83 Indeed, at that time the general credibility 
of monetary institutions was based on the rigid interpretation of anti-inflation fiscal 
policy mainly by Germany.84 Based on the above context, the powerful financial 
interests of German and French industries focused on the materialization of structural 
reforms which would improve their competitiveness on a global level.85 On the one 
hand, Germany’s financial interests were identified to the need of eliminating fiscal 
deficits within EMU and desired to reduce political intrusions, while on the other 
hand, the French government wished to continue the process of economic integration 
and simultaneously be politically availed for the country’s internal affairs.86 Yet the 
interests and preferences, as the theory of liberal intergovernmentalism declares, are 
the outcome of domestic political negotiations. The context of domestic politics 
incorporates a number of local factors, such as political parties, or national central 
governments or even commercial unions which act decisively in the formation of the 
member states’ interests. Under the aforementioned circumstances, the German 
initiative for the creation of SGP was a reaction of the German government to the 
opposition’s rhetoric concerning Bundesbank’s criticism and the negative opinion 
expressed by German citizens. Contrary to that, the French side introduced the 
rhetoric of growth which expressed the general opinion of the French citizens.87 The 
creation of SGP was the only answer Germany counteroffered to the lack of common 
fiscal policy or the absence of harmonization of the EMU’s tax system.88 
Economic governance since Maastricht 
In order to understand the existence of the asymmetrical grey zone within the EU we 
should answer clearly how economic policy within EMU is implemented. On the 
monetary level, even though the ECB is responsible for the exercise of monetary 
policy, it does not exercise its most important function. The ECB neither can act as a 
lender of last resort nor can issue Eurobonds. On the fiscal level, the member states 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83 Talani, L. S. 2008. “A Dead Stability and Growth Pact and a Strong Euro: There Must be a 
Mistake.” In Between Growth and Stability: The Demise Reform of the European’s Union 
Stability and Growth Pact, edited by L.S. Talani, and B. Casey. Massachusetts: Edward Elgar 
Publishing. 
84 Moravcsik, A. 1998. The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Mesina 
to Maastricht. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
85 Crouch, C. 2002. “The Euro, and Labour Markets and Wage Policies.” In European States 
and the Euro, edited by K. Dyson. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
86 Heipertz, M. and A. Verdun. 2005. “The Stability and Growth Pact-Theorizing a Case in 
European Integration.” Journal of Common Market Studies 43 (5): 985-1008. 
87 Ibid.  
88 Talani, L. S. 2005. “The European Central Bank: Between Growth and Stability.”  
Comparative European Politics 3 (2): 204-231.  
16	  
	  
remain responsible for their fiscal policy and the SGP was rather an ineffective 
institution both for fiscal discipline and growth. Both in theory and in practice the 
SGP was unable to bind EMU member states to formulate policies related to fiscal 
discipline.89 In theory, fiscal discipline was appointed to SGP without the creation of 
any other mechanism of fiscal union. In practice, France and Germany were the first 
to violate SGP proving that member state governments often wish to follow 
independent macroeconomic policies.90 Under the aforementioned conditions, any 
important decision regarding the transformation of economic governance within the 
EMU had rather an intergovernmental character and the European Council was 
becoming the main arena for the implementation and planning of economic policy and 
the transformation of economic governance. In this regard, the European Council is 
directly identified to the relation of European integration and sovereignty. The 
European leaders that the European Council ‘should not be subject to any legal 
constraints’.91 In other words, the states conveyed supreme authority to the European 
Council concerning decision-making on economic policy, the reform of the EU’s 
economic governance and crises management, and left it unaffected by any legal or 
constitutional authority. Thus, Maastricht Treaty reinforced the power of the Council 
and therefore the future reform of economic governance should first pass through this 
intergovernmental institution and any resulting decision would become the object of 
later negotiations among member states.92 Yet, there are two significant points which 
did not receive the required attention. First, the power of the states in this 
intergovernmental post-national level is not equal in contrast to the equality contained 
in the property of the member state. Second, in this post-national level, the member 
states are forced to bargain in an institutional architecture in which equality is absent 
due to the already enacted rules. These are two very important characteristics which 
are introduced during the transition from the nation state to the member state and by 
the Treaty itself. By this way the element of asymmetry is introduced in the 
integration process.  Therefore, the government leaders have not only created a bridge 
institution between the national and the European arena,93 but they simultaneously 
transferred important sovereign issues of the exercise of economic policy to a 
deterritoriarized environment where the member states’ power affects in a maximum 
degree the final outcome.    
 
Conclusion 
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The above discussion highlights the limits of the process of European integration in 
relation to economic policy. It is clear that on the monetary level, as Amy Verdun 
(1998) had predicted, the Maastricht Treaty allowed not only minor possibilities for 
the exercise of an efficient monetary policy, but it simultaneously introduced limited 
competences to institutional mechanisms responsible for the redistribution of cost and 
benefit within EMU94. It was not clear which institution was held responsible for the 
corrections of these inequalities. In parallel, various other important issues remained 
pending without predicting who and in what way would tackle a potential crisis. The 
conditions on a fiscal policy level were considerably worse. Hence, after Maastricht, 
the exercise of economic policy was transferred to a blurred zone where the monetary 
and fiscal policy as well as significant issues of economic governance, such as the 
rescue of member states, were taken beyond the territorial domination of the state. 
Thus, economic policy within the EMU was achieved mainly via the institutional 
structure created the last years due to the process of European integration. This 
institutional structure, which belongs neither to the supranational nor to the national 
level, creates a grey area in which European politics takes place. Due to this 
institutional structure, certain states rule over others. As a result, during Eurozone’s 
transformation, because of the process of European integration, the institution of 
sovereignty was deterritorialized and the exercise of sovereignty is now practiced in 
blurred level among the national and transnational.  Sovereignty is exercised even 
more asymmetrically carrying with it huge blows to the democratic legitimization of 
the plan and to the very essence of European integration. It is evident that since no 
nation state could exist without sovereignty in a geographical area, no member state 
can also exist without the deterritorialized kind of sovereignty which is exercises 
asymmetrically due to the existence of institutional architecture within this blurred 
area of European politics. In this deterritorialized arena, the most powerful nations 
ruled over the powerless and the various intergovernmental or supranational players, 
official or not, affected not only the final result of the negotiations but more 
importantly the reality of millions of citizens. Within this context, the exercise of 
sovereignty was achieved in the grey area of European politics in an asymmetrical 
way and therefore national sovereignty became asymmetrical sovereignty.     
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